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HAVE JUSTICES STEVENS AND KENNEDY
FORGED A NEW DOCTRINE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS? AN
EXAMINATION OF MCDONALD V. CITY OF
CHICAGO AND UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
By: Douglas S. Broyles
ABSTRACT
As issues such as the nature of the sexual, marital, and other relationships
and claims—both personal and economic—continue to face Americans and
America’s lawyers, the question of how we as a people distinguish fundamen-
tal from non-fundamental rights is one of first importance. In constitutional
law, the Supreme Court has addressed this question through the doctrine of
“Substantive Due Process.”
In his lengthy dissent in McDonald v. Chicago—his final opinion as a Su-
preme Court Justice—Justice John Paul Stevens claimed that substantive due
process is fundamentally a matter of how we interpret the meaning of the word
“liberty.” The issue as to whether the right is specifically enumerated in the
Amendments is irrelevant, Stevens argues, if the interest is naturally within the
definition of “liberty.”  Moreover, Justice Stevens’s argument in McDonald
was approved by his liberal colleagues on the Court, which indicates that his
theory of liberty may well become the baseline for determining what are, and
what are not, fundamental rights. However, in the recent case of United States
v. Windsor, the Court refused to employ the substantive due process doctrine,
as traditionally understood, as the basis for striking down the Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA). Instead, the Court employed rational basis review, find-
ing that the legislative purpose and effect behind DOMA was “to disparage
and to injure” those wishing to enter into same-sex marriages, and thus served
“no legitimate purpose.”  Still, Justice Kennedy clearly signals in his Windsor
opinion that some formulation of the substantive due process doctrine remains
alive and well as a constitutional basis for deciding Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process “liberty” interests such as same-sex marriage.  In-
deed, both Justices share a conceptual core in their understandings of what
constitutes a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will seek to elucidate the current and future state of the
doctrine of substantive due process through an examination of two
recent and seminal cases: McDonald and Windsor. The Article first
considers Justice Stevens’s comprehensive theory of substantive due
process as Justice Stevens set forth in his final Supreme Court opinion
in McDonald.  Part Two examines how and to what extent Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor reflects (or alters) Justice Stevens’s
theory in McDonald.  Part Three reviews the opposing, historically
based theory of substantive due process, as articulated by Justice Al-
ito’s plurality opinion in McDonald, and Justice Scalia’s concurrence
in McDonald and dissent in Windsor.  Part Four examines the theoret-
ical basis behind Justices Stevens’s and Kennedy’s understandings of
constitutionally protected liberty interests.  This Article concludes
with a reflection on the constitutional merits of the respective liberal
and conservative positions, and offers an alternative understanding of
fundamental rights that is arguably more faithful to the understanding
held by the Framers of the Constitution.
II. PART ONE: JUSTICE STEVENS’S THEORY OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Justice Stevens’s dissent in McDonald constitutes his final Supreme
Court opinion; in effect, his swan song.  In this, his final supreme ef-
fort, Justice Stevens seeks to set forth what he considers to be the
definitive understanding of the doctrine of substantive due process.1
In McDonald, the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether the City of Chicago’s restrictive handgun ordinances violated
the Second Amendment’s protection of the right to bear arms.  The
plurality ruled that the right in question is “fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty” and system of justice and is “deeply rooted
in the Nation’s history and tradition,” and consequently it is incorpo-
rated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause.2  Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but argued
that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right that should be ap-
plied against the states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause.3  In
1. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  A person’s “swan
song” is generally understood as a final work or accomplishment. It carries the conno-
tation that the performer is aware that this is his or her last performance, such that
every effort will be expended in one magnificent final effort.
2. Id. at 3036, 3042.
3. Id. at 3059.
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effect, the McDonald plurality opinion simply applied its ruling from
two years earlier in District of Columbia v. Heller against the states by
selective incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.4
In his lengthy dissent in McDonald, Justice Stevens rejected the plu-
rality’s incorporation analysis, arguing instead that the constitutional
question was “whether the interest in keeping in the home a firearm
of one’s choosing . . . is one that is ‘comprised within the term liberty’
in the Fourteenth Amendment.”5  Justice Stevens’s argument is con-
sistent with his longstanding contention that substantive due process is
the constitutionally correct way in which to determine what rights are
fundamental, and that this analysis is essentially a matter of determin-
ing what rights are comprehended under the meaning of “liberty” set
forth in the Fourteenth Amendment.6  In so doing, Justice Stevens re-
jects the analysis of the conservative members of the Court who “in-
corporate” against the states those rights they find to be “fundamental
to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice” and “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”7  As will be discussed,
Justice Stevens contends for a different formulation of the test he be-
lieves correctly identifies those rights deserving of protection under
his definition of “liberty.”8
In his McDonald dissent, Justice Stevens stated definitively: “This is
a substantive due process case.”9  Before turning to Justice Stevens’s
analysis of how substantive due process should be understood, how-
ever, let us briefly consider the doctrine in question.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”10  The Fourteenth Amendment was pro-
posed in 1866 and ratified in 1868.  There exists general agreement
that the Amendment’s most immediate task was to make newly freed
slaves full and equal citizens in the post-Civil War republic in light of
the continuing abuses against the former slaves by many Southern
4. See generally id.; Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing
the Second Amendment’s Right to Bear Arms as a fundamental right).
5. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3107.
6. Id. at 3090.
7. Id. at 3034, 3036.
8. See generally D. Scott Broyles, Doubting Thomas: Justice Clarence Thomas’s
Effort to Resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 46 IND. L. REV. 341 (2013)
[hereinafter Broyles, Doubting Thomas]. Justice Stevens does agree with the plurality
to the extent that he rejects Justice Thomas’s effort to identify fundamental rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.
9. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause tracks the language of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, except that
the former adds the language restricting State action. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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States.11  This was necessary because there was no constitutional vehi-
cle by which state, as opposed to federal, violations of the rights pro-
tected under the Bill of Rights could be addressed.  The Fourteenth
Amendment also effectively overturned the Supreme Court’s pre-
Civil War decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford,12 holding that the Consti-
tution did not recognize blacks equal to whites, and, as such, blacks
could not be considered citizens under the United States Constitution.
The language of the Due Process Clause itself suggests that it is
purely procedural in nature, having no substantive content.13  In other
words, the Clause should not be used to challenge the substance of a
law; it should only be used to ensure that proper procedures are in
place regardless of the law’s intrinsic merit.14  This understanding of
the Due Process Clause, however, changed over time.
In 1908, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the possibility that
the Due Process Clause could incorporate rights set out in the Bill of
Rights against the states.15  In 1925 the Court ruled that the states
were bound by the Free Speech Clause.16  But during roughly the
same period of time, the Court recognized that fundamental rights
that were not explicitly set forth in the Bill of Rights (unenumerated
rights) were also protected by the Due Process Clause against State
infringement.17  The famous case of Lochner v. New York is consid-
ered the seminal case of what has been called the “economic due pro-
cess era.”18
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court eventually
abandoned economic rights (such as the right to contract) as rights
unworthy of substantive due process protection.19  The decisions in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish20 and Nebbia v. New York21 set the
11. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (holding the Four-
teenth Amendment “is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other”).
12. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 413 (1856).
13. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
14. Indeed, there is a considerable body of scholarship that argues that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was the clause that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to be the vehicle for challenging the sub-
stance of laws. See Broyles, Doubting Thomas, supra note 8.
15. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), overruled on other grounds by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
17. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 587–88 (1897) (holding that the Due Pro-
cess Clause protected the unenumerated right to contract).
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that New York laws
restricting the hours of employment in bakery shops violated the right to contract
enjoyed by employers and employees).
19. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100 (2010) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).  This occurred around the time of the New Deal with the seminal case of
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (repudiating Lochner and up-
holding a state minimum wage law for women).
20. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 585–86 (1937).
21. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
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tone for the Court’s deference to legislative discretion in the area of
economic and property rights.  Eventually, non-economic, personal
rights—such as the right to raise one’s children as one chooses and the
right to privacy—came to be protected under substantive due pro-
cess.22  As will be seen, Justice Stevens wholly approves of the change
in substantive due process jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens first addresses the obvious difficulty that the Due
Process Clause, on its face, appears to be procedural in nature: “[No
State shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”23  However, Justice Stevens cites historical evi-
dence, scholarship, Supreme Court cases, and logic in contending that
“[p]rocedural guarantees are hollow unless linked to substantive inter-
ests . . . .”24  In support of his argument, Justice Stevens cites his own
dissenting opinion in Meachum v. Fanno, to the effect that the Due
Process Clause guarantees certain pre-existing fundamental rights,
such as liberty.25  In Meachum, Justice Stevens argued that the trans-
fer of prisoners to less-favorable institutions without adequate process
violated their liberty interests: “I had thought it self-evident that all
men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process
Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges con-
ferred by specific laws or regulations.”26
22. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090.  It should be noted that during the Lochner era
certain personal rights were also protected, such as the right of parents to control the
upbringing and education of their children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–403 (1923) (striking
down a prohibition on teaching foreign languages to school children).
23. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090.  Justice Thomas, for example, makes this point
in his concurrence: “The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only
‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the sub-
stance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.” Id. at
3062.
24. Id. at 3090–91.
25. Id. at 3091 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976)).
26. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230.  In his reference to the language of the Declaration
of Independence, Justice Stevens did not explain why these rights are “unalienable,”
nor did he reference the Founders’ understanding of natural rights by virtue to which
they could claim certain rights to be “unalienable.” In particular, Justice Stevens’s nod
to the Declaration in Meachum omitted Jefferson’s explicit appeal to the “laws of
Nature and Nature’s God.” In further support of his contention that the Due Process
Clause is also substantive in nature, Justice Stevens also cites to several scholarly arti-
cles in a footnote, including Gedicks’s article, “arguing ‘that one widely shared under-
standing of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the late eighteenth
century encompassed judicial recognition and enforcement of unenumerated substan-
tive rights.’” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090 n.5. (quoting Frederick M. Gedicks, An
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitu-
tionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 594 (2009)). But Stevens
entirely omits the major point Gedicks addresses: that Due Process of Law included
an understanding of law bound by natural law.
One widely shared understanding of the Due Process Clause in the late
eighteenth century encompassed judicial recognition of unenumerated sub-
134 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
After addressing the process versus substance issue, Justice Stevens
sets forth his foundational argument, namely “that substantive due
process is fundamentally a matter of personal liberty.  For it is the
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that grounds our most
important holdings in this field.”27 Justice Stevens makes an interest-
ing and persuasive case that other approaches to understanding funda-
mental rights adopted by the High Court are somewhat misguided.  In
particular, he suggests that the use of the terms “privacy” or “equal-
ity”—while important “values”—are not as helpful to the substantive
due process analysis as is the question of what is the proper under-
standing of “liberty.”28
Likewise, the “incorporation” doctrine framework, he maintains,
“is something of a misnomer.”29  Since the Fourteenth Amendment
references “liberty,” it is of secondary importance whether the inter-
est in question is found within the Bill of Rights.30  With these obser-
vations in mind, Justice Stevens then directs the reader to his central
point regarding substantive due process: “Whether an asserted sub-
stantive due process interest is explicitly named in one of the first
eight amendments to the Constitution or is not mentioned [e.g., “pri-
vacy”], the underlying inquiry is the same: We must ask whether the
interest is ‘comprised within the term liberty.’”31
What indeed is the understanding of “liberty” set forth in the Four-
teenth Amendment?  Justice Stevens forthrightly addresses this ques-
tion, although, as will be argued, his answer is arguably less than
stantive rights as limits on congressional power. This concept of “substan-
tive” due process originated in Sir Edward Coke’s notion of a “higher law”
constitutionalism, which understood natural and customary rights as limits
on crown prerogatives and parliamentary lawmaking. The American colo-
nies adopted higher-law constitutionalism in their revolutionary struggle and
carried it with them through independence and constitutional ratification.
Natural and customary rights limited the exercise of legislative power in the
late eighteenth century through the normative definition of “law” inherited
from the classical natural law tradition, which maintained that an unjust law
was not really a “law.”
Gedicks, supra, at 585. In addition, Stevens’s quote of Tribe actually shows the limited
substantive content accorded the Due Process Clause. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at
3090 n.5. (“[T]o qualify as ‘law,’ an enactment would have to meet substantive re-
quirements of rationality, non-oppressiveness, and evenhandedness”) (quoting Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995)).
27. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3091–92.
28. Id. at 3092. See Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 715, 715 (2010) (“The Court’s move from privacy to liberty as a constitutional
basis for the freedom to make fundamental life decisions strengthens the right itself
by anchoring it to constitutional text in a text-happy era, and represents a victory for
Justice Stevens, who has long advocated such a shift.”).
29. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
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satisfactory.  To begin with, Justice Stevens maintains that Justice Car-
dozo’s formulation in Palko v. Connecticut sets forth the “basic in-
quiry,” which asks whether the challenged practice “violates values
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”32  One might object that
this merely begs the question of what criteria should be used to deter-
mine which or when certain “values” are “implicit” in ordered liberty.
Justice Stevens, however, goes further and qualifies the liberty “val-
ues” in question, contending that they “have a universal character,” as
opposed to those values that are merely transitory, idiosyncratic, or
the “personal preferences of their champions . . . .”33  But instead of
locating the universality of these liberty values in universal concepts
such as the Founders’ understanding of natural rights, Justice Stevens
offers a somewhat vaguer characterization, explaining that this univer-
sality stems from either “a ‘rational continuum’ of legal precepts[34] . . .
or a seamless web of moral commitments, the rights embraced by the
liberty clause transcend the local and particular.”35
At this point Justice Stevens leaves us with two options for discern-
ing when a liberty interest is sufficiently universal to deserve substan-
tive due process protection.  The first might fairly be described as
something akin to stare decisis, at least when the decisions pass the
test of rational consistency.36  What falls within the category of moral
commitments that form a “seamless web,” however, cannot readily be
described as self-evident, and Justice Stevens does not offer any spe-
cific examples of such moral commitments.37  Justice Stevens does,
however, warn the reader that metaphysical reason is not to be em-
ployed in locating either this seamless web of moral commitments or
rational continuum of legal precepts: “Justice Cardozo’s test undenia-
bly requires judges to apply their own reasoned judgment, but that
does not mean it involves an exercise in abstract philosophy.”38
Instead of unconstrained “abstract philosophy,” Justice Stevens
provides a list of eight judicial guideposts for applying the Cardozo
test.  These include: (1) “historical and empirical data of various
kinds,” (2) “[t]extual commitments laid down elsewhere in the Consti-
tution,” (3) “judicial precedents,” (4) “English common law,” (5) “leg-
islative and social facts,” (6) “scientific and professional
developments,” (7) “practices of other civilized societies,” and (8)
32. Id. at 3096 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
35. Id.
36. Justice Stevens does not provide us with a means to test this rational consis-
tency, and perhaps none is available.
37. Certainly, no such seamless web can be found in recent substantive due pro-
cess issues such as homosexual rights, abortion rights, or gun rights.
38. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096.
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“above all else, the ‘traditions and conscience of our people . . . .’”39
But, as will be demonstrated, it is Justice Stevens’s theory of “judicial
precedents,” guided by his understanding of the movement of history,
that ultimately drives Justice Stevens’s analysis of the meaning of
“liberty.”40
At this point in his dissent, Justice Stevens returns to a criticism of
the McDonald plurality’s interpretation of Justice Cardozo’s test in
Palko.41  This debate represents a minor skirmish involving competing
analyses of text and precedent regarding how to interpret prior sub-
stantive due process cases, when in fact the real battle is over the soul
of substantive due process.  For Justice Stevens, this battle comes
down to defining substantive due process rights either in terms of
(past) history, or by interpreting the meaning of “liberty” in an histor-
ically forward-looking manner: “Nor, as the Court intimates . . . did
Duncan mark an irreparable break from Palko, swapping out liberty
for history.”42  Moreover, Justice Stevens is quite candid in identifying
the opposing camps and the irreconcilable substantive due process
tests they employ.  The test employed by the conservative members of
the Court is found in Washington v. Glucksberg,43 while Lawrence v.
Texas44 contains the test preferred by the Court’s liberal members:
I acknowledge that some have read the Court’s opinion in Gluck-
sberg as an attempt to move substantive due process analysis, for all
purposes, toward an exclusively historical methodology—and
thereby to debilitate the doctrine. If that were ever Glucksberg’s
aspiration, Lawrence plainly renounced it. As between Glucksberg
and Lawrence, I have little doubt which will prove the more endur-
ing precedent.45
39. Id. Despite his claim to defer to the “traditions and conscience of our people”
“above all else,” Justice Stevens is actually reluctant to look back to such traditions
which, he soon makes clear, are problematic at best: “[F]or we must never forget that
not only slavery but also the subjugation of women and other rank forms of discrimi-
nation are part of our history . . . .” Id. at 3099.
40. See id. at 3099–103.
41. Id. at 3096–97.
42. Id. at 3097.
43. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 704 (1997).
44. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3097 n.16. On June 28, 2010, the date McDonald was
decided, the conservative members of the Court adopting the Glucksberg test were
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Scalia. The liberal members of the Court
agreeing with Justice Stevens’ endorsement of the Lawrence test were Justices Breyer,
Ginsberg, and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas contends that fundamental rights are prop-
erly analyzed under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Although Justice Kennedy
sided with the conservative plurality in Glucksberg, he is the author of the opinion in
Lawrence, where he adopted the somewhat novel definition of substantive due pro-
cess liberties from Casey:
The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford con-
stitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explain-
ing the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in
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Justice Stevens ultimately moves beyond the battle over text and
precedent and levels his most telling criticism of the history-based ap-
proach of the Court’s conservative members.  In its simplest formula-
tion, Justice Stevens points out the obvious fact that sometimes
Americans have done bad things in the past.  Past history, qua history,
lacks any discriminating principle to distinguish justice from injustice;
it is simply what has gone before.  In Justice Stevens’s own words, the
historical approach to substantive due process:
countenances the most revolting injustices in the name of con-
tinuity, for we must never forget that not only slavery but also the
subjugation of women and other rank forms of discrimination are
part of our history; and it effaces this Court’s distinctive role in say-
ing what the law is, leaving the development and safekeeping of lib-
erty to majoritarian political processes.46
In his response to Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia does not attempt to
counter or even answer Justice Stevens’s criticism of a test that relies
on history qua history.  He does not do so, one must assume, at least
in part, because he cannot deny the logic of Justice Stevens’s
critique.47
Having debunked—on textual and logical grounds—what he refers
to as the conservatives’ “rigid historical methodology,”48 Justice Ste-
vens returns to his explication of the meaning of “liberty” in the Four-
teenth Amendment.  As Justice Stevens has already argued, its
meaning is not accessible through metaphysical reason (“abstract phi-
losophy”).49  Consistent with his disclaimer concerning “abstract phi-
losophy” as a source for discerning the universal character of liberty
making these choices, we stated as follows:  “These matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these pur-
poses, just as heterosexual persons do.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3099.
47. It must also be noted, however, that Justice Scalia’s substantive due process
jurisprudence, like much of his jurisprudence in general, is driven by his concern with
judicial usurpation.  Indeed, his concurrence in McDonald is written for the express
purpose of countering Justice Stevens (“I write separately only to respond to some
aspects of Justice Stevens’s dissent,” the theory of which he describes as “usurpation”
by the judiciary of democratic government. Id. at 3050, 3058.).  Because Justice Scalia
understands it to be the majority’s function and responsibility to decide on fundamen-
tal rights, he is less concerned with whether his history-based jurisprudence counte-
nances injustice, as Justice Stevens contends. For Justice Scalia, it is largely a matter of
respecting the separated powers, as he understands them.
48. Id. at 3098.
49. Id.
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claims, Justice Stevens denies that there exists “any all-purpose, top-
down, totalizing theory of ‘liberty.’”50
Not only is it the case that no “broad theory of the right or the
good” can define liberty’s meaning, we are also to understand, “[t]he
Framers did not express a clear understanding of the term to guide
us.”51  Instead, liberty is a “dynamic concept.”52  As to the meaning of
“liberty,” “[as it was] elsewhere explained at some length, was a part
of the work assigned to future generations.”53  Moreover, Justice Ste-
vens approvingly quotes Justice Kennedy to the effect that:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the com-
ponents of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been
more specific.  They did not presume to have this insight.  They
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can
see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, persons in every genera-
tion can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.54
At this point the reader of Justice Stevens’s opinion might be justifia-
bly perplexed as to where to look for the meaning of “liberty.”  After
all, Justice Stevens has disclaimed (1) history (except as a “starting
point” in Due Process analysis), (2) broad theories or philosophical
understandings, and (3) interpretations advanced by the Framers of
the Constitution.55  And yet, rights derived from liberty’s meaning are
universal in nature.  It is Justice Stevens’s understanding of universal-
ity that provides his guide to the perplexed.
Justice Stevens’s conception of “liberty” embraces fundamental
rights that are universal, transcending the transitory and idiosyn-
cratic.56  Moreover, this universality stems from either “a ‘rational
50. Id. at 3100.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3099.  Justice Stevens purposely uses very vague, abstract terms when
identifying or justifying those fundamental rights he sees deserving of protection, in
order to allow for greater flexibility, greater room, for future Supreme Courts to con-
tinue to redefine or expand upon liberty’s “dynamic” quality. Id. at 3101. To prepare
the way for this process, Justice Stevens must unmoor substantive due process from
the bonds of the past, and in particular, from the conservative Justices’ history-based
jurisprudence, or any “categorical understanding,” or “all-purpose, top-down, total-
izing theory of liberty.” Id. at 3100–01. Ultimately, Justice Stevens must leave his
definition of “liberty” vague because any attempt to define the term with any preci-
sion would undermine Lawrence v. Texas’ call to existential freedom: “At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
53. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3099 (quoting John P. Stevens, The Third Branch of
Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277, 291 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)).
54. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
55. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3097 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572).
56. Id. at 3096.
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continuum’ of legal precepts57 . . . or a seamless web of moral commit-
ments . . . .”58  As noted, we do not find much, if any, discussion of this
“seamless web of moral commitments,”59 but we do find a very great
deal of discussion of those legal precepts that Justice Stevens believes
represent a “rational continuum.”  In other words, a certain formula-
tion of stare decisis represents the key to unlocking the mystery of the
meaning of “liberty.”  As we will see, Justice Stevens’s definition of
stare decisis has a decidedly forward-looking quality in that the “ra-
tional continuum” is one that evolves in a “dynamic” fashion as
Americans adapt to an “emerging consensus” involving “especially
significant personal interests.”60
Stare decisis as the vehicle for interpreting liberty’s meaning, as op-
posed to the Framers’ understanding (particularly any “abstract phi-
losophy” they may have associated with the word), becomes the
cornerstone of Justice Stevens’s “liberty” jurisprudence.  For whatever
difficulties may be associated with defining “liberty” in the abstract,
its meaning, he claims, can be “refined and delimited.”61  And for Jus-
tice Stevens, this is the peculiar province of the Supreme Court.
Indeed, Justice Stevens describes this obligation in a manner that
one might plausibly describe as an exercise of will rather than judg-
ment: “We have insisted that only certain types of especially signifi-
cant personal interests may qualify for especially heightened
protection.”62  It should be noted that these “especially significant
personal interests” do not include property rights: “Ever since ‘the
deviant economic due process cases [were] repudiated,’63 . . . our doc-
trine has steered away from ‘laws that touch economic problems
. . . .’”64  Justice Stevens does not find it necessary to inform the
reader from what these cases deviated.
This process of “refin[ing] and delimit[ing]” the meaning of “lib-
erty” through Supreme Court decisions, Justice Stevens repeats, re-
places any theoretical understanding of the word, and he reveals to
the reader what the process has produced:
Rather than seek a categorical understanding of the liberty clause,
our precedents have thus elucidated a conceptual core. The clause
safeguards, most basically, “the ability independently to define
57. Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, at 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
58. Id.
59. Perhaps Justice Stevens means that the “seamless web of moral commitments”
is subsumed by, or to be located within, the “rational continuum of legal precepts.”
60. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3100.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
64. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
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one’s identity,”65 . . . “the individual’s right to make certain unusu-
ally important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s,
destiny,”66 . . . and the right to be respected as a human being. Self-
determination, bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, intimate re-
lationships, political equality, dignity and respect—these are the
central values we have found implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.67
Justice Stevens, then, distinguishes between a “categorical” under-
standing of “liberty,” which we are to avoid, and a “conceptual” un-
derstanding, which we are to embrace.  But how are we to identify the
“core” of this conceptual understanding in the list he provides?  In
other words, what unites values such as (1) the right to make impor-
tant family decisions, (2) the right to be respected as a human being,
(3) self-determination, (4) bodily integrity, (5) freedom of conscience,
(6) intimate relationships, (7) political equality, (8) dignity, and (9)
respect?  Logically, all these values can be understood as subsets of
the first value he identifies, that is, the core concept of autonomous,
existential freedom, or “the ability to define one’s identity.”68
At this point, it is important to recall Justice Stevens’s earlier sug-
gestion that the battle for the soul of substantive due process jurispru-
dence may well come down to whether Glucksberg or Lawrence
triumphs.69  Justice Stevens clearly endorses Lawrence, while rejecting
what he considers Glucksberg’s excessive reliance on history.  The
“conceptual core” of the Lawrence opinion’s definition of liberty is as
follows:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.70
While certain of the “central values” Justice Stevens identifies in the
above quotation in McDonald are unexceptional (“bodily integrity,”
“freedom of conscience,” and “political equality”), his reference to
“the ability independently to define one’s identity,” suggests a some-
what more radical understanding of liberty than cases prior to Casey
65. Id. at 3101 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
66. Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719 (1975)).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. I use the word “existential” because it best captures the meaning of ‘defin-
ing’—which is in the nature of an act of the will—as opposed to ‘understanding’ one’s
identity.
69. Id. at 3097.
70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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and Lawrence have advanced.  Moreover, the quotation is effectively
a restatement, albeit worded slightly differently, of the above quote
from Lawrence:  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life.”71  For both statements, existential self-definition
is the “conceptual core” of the meaning of liberty.
Finally, it is helpful to consider Justice Stevens’s comments concern-
ing core values and how they are tied to the movement of history.
This consideration is assisted by an examination of Justice Stevens’s
reflections on the nature of the death penalty. In fact, Justice Stevens’s
analysis of “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment bears consid-
erable resemblance to his analysis of the death penalty as a “cruel and
unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.  In both cases,
Justice Stevens argues that: (1) the Framers did not attempt to provide
significant meaning to the constitutional term in question, (2) history
contains within it an evolutionary upward trajectory, and (3) that the
Supreme Court is the diviner and expositor of that movement:
The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohi-
bition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but
they made no attempt to define the contours of that category. They
delegated that task to future generations of judges, who have been
guided by the “evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.”72
While the well-known “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society” phrase has primarily been limited to
Eighth Amendment cases, the evolution of standards and maturation
of society referenced by the language clearly applies to Americans’
understanding of societal values generally, and not simply to the death
penalty alone.  In other words, the “evolving standards of decency”
framework of analysis applies to, and is entirely consistent with, Jus-
tice Stevens’s understanding of substantive due process as well.
Other opinions by Justice Stevens provide keys to his substantive
due process jurisprudence as well.  For instance, Justice Stevens also
evinces a distrust of the past in his reflections on issues involving ho-
mosexuality: “Unfavorable opinions about homosexuals ‘have ancient
71. Id.
72. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.)); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311–12 (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”); Gomez v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 658 (1992) (“In light of our contemporary under-
standing of the methods of execution, and in light of less cruel alternatives presently
available, I believe that execution by cyanide gas is incompatible with the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
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roots.’73 Like equally atavistic opinions about certain racial groups,
those roots have been nourished by sectarian doctrine.”74  Atavism
has been defined as something akin to an evolutionary throwback.
Thus, in the area of sexual relationships, we also find in Justice Ste-
vens a tendency to equate error with the past, or more particularly, an
aspect of the past that has been historically superseded by more
evolved standards.
Even traditional distinctions between men and women are subject
to Justice Stevens’s skepticism concerning opinions of preceding gen-
erations: “Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and
natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, le-
gitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the
same inertia in distinguishing between black and white.”75
Finally, property rights, Justice Stevens maintains, are also subject
to history’s evolutionary movement: “Arresting the development of
the common law is not only a departure from our prior decisions; it is
also profoundly unwise. The human condition is one of constant learn-
ing and evolution—both moral and practical.”76
The idea of evolution in moral consciousness, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, then, forms the core of Justice Stevens’s substantive
due process jurisprudence.  This is evident in the similarity of his anal-
yses, whether the subject be the death penalty, sexual rights, gender
distinctions, property rights, or the idea of liberty itself.
A. The Role of the Supreme Court
A dedication to the current and future generations’ values and com-
mitments over past generations, combined with the claim that “[t]he
Framers did not express a clear understanding of the term to guide
us,” leads Justice Stevens to assign to the Supreme Court the duty of
discerning those fundamental liberty interests that will result in
“greater freedom”77 for each succeeding generation.  In addition to
the evident assumption in Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence that history
is inexorably moving toward ever greater freedom, is the notion that
the Court is the prophetic vanguard of that movement: “Although
that idea [of liberty] is difficult to define, the Court has given it mean-
ing in specific cases and controversies. On the whole, the Court’s deci-
73. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 699 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
74. Id.
75. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
77. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100 (2010).
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sions interpreting and reinterpreting the idea of liberty have enlarged
the concept.”78
At this point, Justice Stevens’s forward-looking theory of stare deci-
sis becomes clearer.  It does not go back to Lochner or the Founding;
rather, it begins in the decisive year of 1937 when the Supreme
Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish79 repudiated the
Lochner era.  Nineteen thirty-seven is also the year that Palko was
decided, and Justice Cardozo’s formulation of the substantive due
process test in Palko provides the beginning point of Justice Stevens’s
test.  As we have seen, however, it is only the beginning because Jus-
tice Stevens has grafted onto Justice Cardozo’s language the test set
forth in Casey and Lawrence.  Thus, Justice Stevens’s theory of sub-
stantive due process looks to the “rational continuum” that begins in
1937 and continues up through the Court’s more recent decisions in
Casey and Lawrence.  In these cases, Justice Stevens indicates, the
Court has identified the “evolving notions of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society” and, in particular, those personal
rights attaching to each person’s journey toward autonomous self-def-
inition.  As history progresses and society continues to evolve and ma-
ture, liberty’s “dynamic” conceptual core will come to embrace new
forms of self-definition.  And it will be the province of the Supreme
Court to divine those new forms, and “insist” that they “qualify for
especially heightened protection.”
III. PART TWO: WINDSOR AND THE SECOND WAY TO VIEW
“LIBERTY” UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
In McDonald, Justice Stevens’s argument was approved by his lib-
eral colleagues on the Court, thereby indicating that his theory of lib-
erty may well become the baseline for determining what are, and what
are not, fundamental rights. When rights are determined to be funda-
mental under the doctrine of substantive due process, of course, state
action substantially burdening or eliminating such rights is subject to
strict scrutiny review.  However, in the recent case of United States v.
Windsor, the Court did not employ the substantive due process doc-
trine as the basis for striking down § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).80  Instead, in his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy
employed rational basis review, finding that the legislative purpose
and effect behind DOMA was “to disparage and to injure” those
78. John P. Stevens, The Bill of Rights:  A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
13, 33 (1992) (emphasis added).
79. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  The Court in West Coast
Hotel upheld the state of Washington’s law providing for a minimum-wage to women,
even though the Court had struck down a nearly identical law in Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  The year 1937 is widely recognized as the date when
the Lochner era ended and substantive due process no longer recognized property
and contract rights as fundamental in nature.
80. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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wishing to enter into same-sex marriages, and thus served “no legiti-
mate purpose.”81  But both Justices Stevens and Kennedy based their
arguments on a similar theory of liberty they claim gives meaning to
that word as set forth in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due
Process Clauses.82  Thus, despite the similarity in their theoretical ac-
counts of what comprises a constitutionally protected “liberty” inter-
est, Justices Stevens and Kennedy apply different constitutional
“tests” when it comes to safeguarding those liberty interests.  The re-
sult is such that the Court now has more than one constitutional test
available to it when it seeks to strike down laws it sees as violating
certain liberty interests, but it has accomplished this result by sacrific-
ing jurisprudential clarity and cogency when it comes to understand-
ing the Constitution’s protection of “liberty.”
United States v. Windsor involved DOMA, enacted in 1996.83
DOMA states that under federal law the words “marriage” and
“spouse” refer only to legal unions between one man and one
woman.84
Edith Windsor had been married in 2007 in Toronto, Canada to
Thea Clara Spyer.85 Their marriage was recognized by New York state
law.86  However, Spyer died in 2009, leaving her estate to Windsor.87
But because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the
government imposed $363,000 in taxes.88  Had their marriage been
recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption,
and no taxes would have been imposed.89  On November 9, 2010,
Edith Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that
DOMA violated the equal protection principles incorporated in the
Fifth Amendment.90  The district court ruled for Windsor and against
the United States, holding § 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional.91
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s rul-
81. Id. at 2696.
82. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy explicitly confirmed his agreement with Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers: “Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been
controlling in Bowers and should control here.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
577–78 (2003). Moreover, Justice Kennedy quotes at length from the Bowers’s dissent
in which Justice Stevens argues that homosexual activity was a form of “liberty” pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. Notably, Justice Ste-
vens goes on to cite a line of what he considers to be Substantive Due Process cases:
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (This protection extends to intimate
choices by unmarried as well as married persons); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
83. See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.







91. Id. at 2682.
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ing by applying heightened scrutiny to DOMA’s classifications based
on sexual orientation.92
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Windsor.93  He was
joined by those considered to be the more liberal members of the
Court to form a five-person majority.94  As this Article will argue, Jus-
tice Kennedy has expanded the tests the Court may now employ in
evaluating liberty interests, but has done so at the expense of jurispru-
dential clarity.
Justice Kennedy takes up the liberty interest argument in Part
Three of his opinion for the Court.95  He begins with an account of
opinions of Americans concerning same-sex marriages by contrasting
the past with the present.96  In the past, many Americans “had not
even considered the possibility” of same-sex marriage.97  But the
times are changing, and to many present-day Americans “came the
beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight.”98  This new insight
concerns the validity of marriage for those “same-sex couples who
wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other.”99  Jus-
tice Kennedy recounts how New York, “in common with, as of this
writing, 11 other States and the District of Columbia” has passed laws
legalizing same-sex marriages.100  According to Justice Kennedy, then,
that which heretofore had not received the benefit of reflection is now
emerging as an insight into the new “liberty” paradigm of self-
definition.101
It is “[a]gainst this background of lawful same-sex marriage in some
States, [that] the design, purpose, and effect of DOMA should be con-
sidered as the beginning point in deciding whether it is valid under the
Constitution.”102  In short, the background in question is one in which
present and future insights are replacing the lack of reflection that
characterizes the past.
Justice Kennedy spends the next seven paragraphs of his opinion
discussing the federalism concerns implicated in the marriage ques-
tion.  He points out how the role of the federal government has tradi-
tionally been quite limited in the area of laws affecting the marriage
relationship, whereas “the definition and regulation of marriage . . .
has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the sepa-
92. Id. at 2684.
93. See generally id.
94. Specifically, Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsberg,
Sotomayor, and Kagen.  The four more conservative members of the Court dissented;
specifically, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
95. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
96. See id. at 2689–90.
97. Id. at 2689.
98. Id.
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rate States.”103  Despite his spilling a considerable amount of ink on
the federalism question, Justice Kennedy ultimately—and somewhat
surprisingly—rejects federalism as the appropriate constitutional
grounds for overturning § 3 of DOMA.104
In fact, it is “unnecessary to decide” the federalism question be-
cause the inquiry into deprivation of a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest takes precedence.105  Specifically, the Court must
“address whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of
an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”106
Justice Kennedy’s extended discussion of how federalism principles
support state over federal authority (when it comes to regulating mar-
riage) is merely a means by which he hopes to provide additional evi-
dence to support his argument that DOMA’s departure from those
principles represents “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character.”107
In other words, this departure is but one piece of the puzzle that Jus-
tice Kennedy will present to reveal an irrational (and hence unconsti-
tutional) intent to harm a particular group.108
The cases Justice Kennedy cites in support of his “[d]iscrimina-
tion[s] of an unusual character” principle are two equal protection
cases: Romer v. Evans and Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.109  At this point
in the opinion, it would be reasonable to assume that Windsor will be
decided on equal protection grounds.  But there is no clear statement
to that effect, although Justice Kennedy does cite to Bolling v. Sharpe
at a later point in his opinion.110  By way of contrast, in his ruling in
Romer, Justice Kennedy was quite explicit in finding an equal protec-
tion violation in Colorado’s law limiting homosexual rights: “Amend-
ment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed.”111  Unlike the clarity that he
provided in Romer, however, Justice Kennedy directs the reader to
the “liberty” interest he believes is violated by Section 3 of DOMA.112
103. Id. at 2689–90.
104. See id. at 2695–96.
105. Id. at 2692.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
108. In his dissent, Justice Scalia notes Justice Kennedy’s discussion of federalism
principles and wonders at his colleague’s purpose in giving the topic such an extensive
treatment, particularly when Justice Kennedy quickly disclaims reliance on those prin-
ciples for purposes of the decision: “But no one questions the power of the States to
define marriage (with the concomitant conferral of dignity and status), so what is the
point of devoting seven pages to describing how long and well established that power
is?” Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2692 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928)).
110. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling has been interpreted as the case
in which the Court found equal protection principles implicit in the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause.
111. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36.
112. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy goes further and supplies meaning to the
“liberty” interest—same-sex marriage—at issue in this case, as that
interest comprises, at least in part, the “initiative of those who
[sought] a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times.”113 Law-
rence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy informs us in Windsor, also supplies
meaning to the “liberty” interest in question: “Private, consensual sex-
ual intimacy between two adult persons of the same sex may not be
punished by the State, and it can form ‘but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring.’”114
Such a “liberty” interest clearly implicates more than equal protec-
tion analysis alone, for a law (such as Texas’ law) that punishes homo-
sexual sex was deemed unconstitutional on substantive grounds.115
But Justice Kennedy concludes Part Three of his Windsor opinion
stating that the intimacy of relationships, so central to the reasoning in
Lawrence, reflects both “the community’s considered perspective on
the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving un-
derstanding of the meaning of equality.”116  At this point it is unclear
what constitutional doctrine Justice Kennedy is invoking, except that
it in some manner involves “liberty” interests similar to those usually
analyzed under substantive due process, equal protection interests,
and understandings of both liberty and equality that are part of an
evolving American understanding.117
Part Four of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor addresses the
purpose and effect of DOMA, and he finds the law to fail both prongs
of the test.118  Not only was DOMA passed with the purpose of harm-
ing those seeking same-sex marriages, but its effect did harm that
group by denying them equal financial and social status.119  Justice
Kennedy’s analysis of DOMA’s purpose and effect might be under-
stood simply as an equal protection analysis, as he primarily refer-
ences the intent to create an unequal playing field, as well as the
unequal effects that do in fact result.120  Moreover, Justice Kennedy
113. Id. at 2692 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011)).
114. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
115. And, in fact, Lawrence v. Texas is not an Equal Protection Clause case.
116. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–93.
117. As will be discussed, the dissents of Justices Scalia and Alito also find Justice
Kennedy’s arguments unclear at best. Justice Scalia bemoans “how rootless and shift-
ing its justifications are.” Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Alito notes that the
majority opinion is “related” to “equal protection principles,” but also that “substan-
tive due process may partially underlie the Court’s decision today.” Id. at 2714 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
118. See generally id. at 2693.
119. Id. at 2693–95.
120. “The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to rec-
ognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for
purposes of federal law.” Id. at 2693–94. “DOMA writes inequality into the entire
United States Code.” Id. at 2694. “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to im-
pose inequality.” Id.
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again cites to the equal protection cases of Romer, Moreno, and Boll-
ing v. Sharpe.121  But this initial understanding does not hold up.  Just
as it appeared that Justice Kennedy was invoking “liberty” interests
similar to those usually analyzed under substantive due process in Part
Three of his opinion, here in Part Four, Justice Kennedy begins with
the following statement: “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New
York seeks to protect.  By doing so it violates basic due process and
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”122
Had Justice Kennedy meant to invoke equal protection alone, he
would have said something like, “By doing so it violates the equal
protection principle this Court has found to be an implicit part of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”123
Moreover, Justice Kennedy restates his reliance on Lawrence here
in Part Four, thereby reaffirming the distinct, constitutionally based
liberty interest he sees at play.124  If there were any doubt in the
Windsor opinion that Justice Kennedy intends to provide constitu-
tional protection for the kind of liberty interests he advances, his argu-
ment in Lawrence put all such doubt to rest:
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners
and some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring
the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.  That is
a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case requires us to
address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity.  Were we to
hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some
might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differ-
ently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and dif-
ferent-sex participants.
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand re-
spect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty
are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests.  If protected conduct is made criminal and
the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive valid-
ity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn
for equal protection reasons.125
Like the right to same-sex sexual activity, same-sex marriage is “pro-
tected by the substantive guarantee of liberty”; that is, by some formu-
lation of Substantive Due Process.126
121. See id. at 2689.
122. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added).
123. By speaking in the plural, Justice Kennedy clearly points to the liberty interest
he has been discussing, as well as the more obvious equal protection principle he
invokes.
124. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709.
125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003).
126. Id. at 575. Although the doctrine of substantive due process is generally associ-
ated with the Fourteenth Amendment (which Amendment was invoked in Lawrence
to strike down the Texas anti-sodomy law), Justice Kennedy does not appear to treat
the “liberty” interests protected by the Fifth Amendment any differently.
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Finally, Justice Kennedy finds considerable evidence of a purpose to
injure “the equal dignity of same-sex marriages”127 in the House of
Representatives’ Report’s references to the “moral” underpinnings of
DOMA’s defense of traditional marriage.128  But how can Justice
Kennedy equate moral disapproval with a purpose to “disparage and
to injure,”129 especially given the fact that, as Justice Scalia notes in his
dissent: “[T]he Constitution does not forbid the government to en-
force traditional moral and sexual norms.130  I will not swell the U.S.
Reports with restatements of that point.”131  Notably, Justice Kennedy
never takes issue with the claim that the Constitution does not forbid
the government to legislate on morals.  Nor does it appear that Justice
Scalia’s charge goes to the heart of Justice Kennedy’s argument.  For
Justice Kennedy, it is not legislation regarding morals, per se, rather it
is those moral understandings of the past that are ignorant because
they are blind to new “insights.”  In other words, only those moral
claims that are not part of the “evolving understanding of the meaning
of equality” (or liberty) that qualify as intending to “disparage and to
injure.”
Justice Kennedy’s disparagement of natural rights discussed earlier
now comes into better focus.  Justice Kennedy’s rejection of natural
rights is necessary for the successful realization of a community of fel-
low citizens defining their own concepts of existence, because the re-
sulting self-definitions are, inherently, radically autonomous.  Natural
rights mean natural limits and the consequent disapproval of those
decisions (self-definitions) that reject or ignore those limits.  Thus
moral disapproval that is based on any such antiquated understanding
must be characterized as animus, not only because society has ma-
tured beyond this understanding, but because, on a practical level,
such disapproval will undermine a peaceful, harmonious citizenry.
Put differently, moral disapproval is necessarily, and must necessarily,
be characterized as animus.
Returning to the question asked earlier, how is Justice Kennedy’s
due process defense of “liberty” consistent with, or a departure from
Justice Stevens’s theory of “liberty” under substantive due process
analysis?  It will be evident that Justices Stevens and Kennedy have
very similar theoretical accounts of what comprise constitutionally
protected “liberty” interests. Despite this similarity, however, Justices
Stevens and Kennedy apply different constitutional “tests” when it
127. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95.
128. The House concluded that DOMA expresses “both moral disapproval of ho-
mosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with tradi-
tional (especially Judeo–Christian) morality.” Id. at 2693. The stated purpose of the
law was to promote an “interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected
in heterosexual-only marriage laws.” Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 2696.
130. Id. at 2707; see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707.
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comes to safeguarding those liberty interests.  But are these tests con-
sistent with one another?  This Article argues that the tests are consis-
tent with one another and offers distinct but complimentary ways to
analyze the liberty interests in question.132
The theory of “liberty” interests that the liberal side of the Court—
led by Justices Stevens and Kennedy—is willing to defend, it appears,
has two tracks.  The first track involves those liberty interests the lib-
eral members are willing to characterize as fundamental.  These inter-
ests will receive strict scrutiny protection.  The second track involves
those liberty interests the liberal members are interested in protecting,
but unwilling to characterize as fundamental—such as same-sex (sex-
ual and marital) relationships.  These interests will receive rational ba-
sis protection, and generally be struck down on the basis of what the
Court characterizes as animus toward the interests in question.
But even though the Court decides to assign the liberty interest in
question to one track or another, the liberty interest itself will be ana-
lyzed in a similar fashion either way.  In either case, the liberty inter-
est will receive constitutional protection—via strict scrutiny or
rational basis—if it can be said to have the following characteristics:
(1) it can be described as conforming to the paradigm of existential
self-definition; (2) it is considered part of the continuing evolution in
moral consciousness, as opposed to past misconceptions.  In this re-
gard, morality remains a legitimate legislative interest, as long as the
law in question conforms to the post-1937 rational continuum that
captures the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.”  Thus morality, and the morals’ legislation, be-
comes co-extensive with “liberty,” which is understood as autonomous
self-definition.  No law that indicates intolerance with this new para-
digm will survive the Court’s new Due Process tests.  And critical to
the jurisprudential process is the recognition that it is the unique re-
sponsibility of the Supreme Court to recognize and identify those lib-
erty interests that it believes fall within this “rational continuum” that
represents the correct decisions of the Court.
IV. PART THREE:  THE CONSERVATIVES’ DEEPLY
ROOTED RESPONSE
In his plurality opinion in McDonald, Justice Alito adheres to the
Court’s reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
as the locus for fundamental rights jurisprudence (“substantive due
process”).133  He concludes that the Due Process Clause protects the
Second Amendment as a fundamental right against state infringe-
132. Justice Stevens, after all, fully endorsed Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Law-
rence, which opinion did not employ a substantive due process analysis, but rather a
rational basis analysis similar to the one employed in Windsor.
133. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026–50 (plurality opinion).
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ment.134  Justice Alito relies on the Due Process Clause even though
he does not attempt to defend it on the basis of the text of the Consti-
tution.135  Instead, he relies on the test that emerged from Duncan v.
Louisiana136 and Washington v. Glucksberg.137  Consistent with these
two cases, as Justice Alito contends, the test is whether a right is “fun-
damental to our scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”138
Justice Alito’s reliance upon rights that are “fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition” continues the substantive due process jurisprudence
that conservative members of the Court have come to embrace in re-
cent decades.139
In his concurrence in McDonald—a concurrence directed at rebut-
ting Justice Stevens’s theory of substantive due process—Justice Scalia
repeated the same “history and tradition” test.  This is the test the
conservative members of the Court consider appropriate when analyz-
ing substantive due process issues.
History and tradition, and not any reference to higher law principles
or evolving moral norms, have become the sources for identifying fun-
damental rights.  As Justice Scalia contends, only a jurisprudence
grounded in the deeply rooted traditions of the past can be faithful to
the democratic form of government in which the people, rather than
the Supreme Court, decide the fundamental moral issues confronting
the nation.140  Unless and until the people speak—whether the issue is
abortion or same-sex marriage—the Court’s role is one of interpreta-
tion of what has been decided in the past.141  Moreover, and just as
importantly to Justice Scalia’s mind, any other jurisprudential ap-
proach (particularly when it involves the kind of issues that are in-
volved in substantive due process analysis) only invites a form of
judicial tyranny.142
134. Id. at 3030–31.
135. See id. at 3031–32.
136. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
137. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 704 (1997).
138. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
139. Id.; see, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191–94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–27 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
140. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705–07 (2013).
141. Id. at 2698–99.
142. Id. at 2699.
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V. PART FOUR: THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF JUSTICES
STEVENS’S AND KENNEDY’S UNDERSTANDINGS OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED LIBERTY INTERESTS
It is a tricky matter to try and discern the philosophic underpinnings
of a Supreme Court Justice.  After all, Justices are lawyers, not philos-
ophers.  But it is clear that certain dominant ideas characterize the
decidedly different theories of substantive due process that divide the
liberal and conservative sides of the Court.  Moreover, the process of
distinguishing fundamental from non-fundamental rights that substan-
tive due process requires necessarily involves theoretical analysis and
arriving at theoretical propositions.  We see this in the Justices’ opin-
ions, and their analyses and propositional statements that form the
bases of their dominant ideas, which invite one to consider what they
may be based on at a deeper, albeit generally unspoken, level.  It is
the argument of this Article that the ideas advanced by Justices Ste-
vens and Kennedy—in their attempts to define those liberty interests
deserving of constitutional protection—reveal a substantial kinship to
the theory of Progressivism.  It is, after all, the advent of Progressivist
theory that effectively attacked and largely defeated the natural rights
philosophy of the Founders, ushering in a new understanding of law,
politics, and the Constitution itself.
What is Progressivism, and how influential in shaping American
thought has it been?  Increasingly, scholars are seeking answers to this
question.143 As a general matter, Progressivism was a movement re-
sponding to the serious social changes brought by the Industrial
Revolution in the late nineteenth century, and the idea that progress
was being retarded by laissez-faire capitalism that resulted in signifi-
cant economic inequality between the rich and the poor.144  Professor
Edward A. Purcell, Jr. provides a concise account of Progressivism’s
political agenda as:
[a] broader and more diverse movement aimed at controlling corpo-
rations, rationalizing social and economic institutions, ameliorating
the harsh consequences of industrialism, utilizing science and expert
knowledge for democratic ends, and, in the name of “the people,”
taking control of government from political “bosses” and “special
interests.”145
143. See, e.g., AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM (Ronald J. Pestritto & William J. Atto
eds., 2008); CHALLENGES TO THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: SLAVERY, HISTORICISM,
AND PROGRESSIVISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas
G. West eds., 2005); BRADLEY C.S. WATSON, LIVING CONSTITUTION, DYING FAITH:
PROGRESSIVISM AND THE NEW SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE (ISI Books, 2009); ED-
WARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION (Yale
Univ. 2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITU-
TION (Cato Inst. 2006).
144. WALTER NUGENT, PROGRESSIVISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 2 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010).
145. PURCELL, supra note 143, at 11–12.
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On a deeper, philosophical level, Professors Ronald Pestritto and
William Atto describe Progressivism’s core principles, as follows:
Whereas the [F]ounders had posited what they held to be a perma-
nent understanding of just government, based upon a permanent
account of human nature, the [P]rogressives countered that the ends
and scope of government were to be defined anew in each historical
epoch. They couple this perspective of historical contingency with a
deep faith in historical progress . . . .146
Human nature, in other words, lacks permanent characteristics; in-
stead, in significant respects human nature is subject to historical
change or evolution.  Moreover, change is for the good; it is progres-
sive in nature.  The Founders’ understanding that there exists a “per-
manent account of human nature”—from which “natural rights” are
derived—is at odds with this new insight into progressive historical
change.  As we shall see, the Progressives not only considered the
Founders’ understanding to be misguided, but also to be an obstacle
to the new science of law and politics that is based on the new insights
into the nature of historical change.
As this Author has argued elsewhere, there “is a growing scholarly
recognition that natural law and natural rights did, in fact, form the
theoretical basis for the political philosophy of the Founding Fa-
thers.”147  A brief examination of a few of the Founders’ most promi-
nent references to natural law and natural rights should prove
illustrative of this point as well as provide an appreciation of how they
viewed the connection between natural rights and the Constitution.
Moreover, such an examination is helpful as a background for appre-
ciating what Progressivism sought to replace.
As the author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jeffer-
son wrote that in declaring independence from Great Britain, the
American Revolutionaries appealed to the “Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God,” noting that human beings are “endowed by their Cre-
ator” with certain “unalienable Rights.”148  Jefferson’s reference to
natural law and natural (“unalienable”) rights demonstrates the con-
nection between the two: natural rights are derived from natural law.
Jefferson’s statements in the Declaration of Independence reveal that
natural rights are those particular claims—assertions of principle—
that form the basis upon which a just government is established, and
that limit government authority.  A truly just form of government,
therefore, is one which seeks “to secure these rights,” which is why
“[g]overnments are instituted among Men.”149  Moreover, the govern-
ment’s failure to secure mankind’s fundamental natural rights, gives
146. AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 143, at 3.
147. Broyles, Doubting Thomas, supra note 8, at 346. A more complete discussion
of the Founders’ understanding of natural rights is provided in this article.
148. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
149. Id. para. 2.
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rise to the right to revolution—“the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it.”150  Jefferson, moreover, believed that all Americans seek-
ing to break away from Great Britain shared a common dedication to
the Declaration’s principles:
All American Whigs thought alike on these subjects.  When forced,
therefore, to resort to arms for redress, an appeal to the tribunal of
the world was deemed proper for our justification.  This was the
object of the Declaration of Independence.  Not to find out new
principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely
to say things which had never been said before; but to place before
mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and
firm as to command their assent . . . .  Neither aiming at originality
of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and
previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the Ameri-
can mind . . . .  All its authority rests then on the harmonizing senti-
ments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters,
printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aris-
totle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.151
Jefferson later reaffirmed his personal dedication to natural rights
as central to republican government stating that “[e]very species of
government has its specific principles.  Ours perhaps are more pecu-
liar than those of any other in the universe.  It is a composition of the
freest principles of the English constitution, with others derived from
natural right and natural reason.”152  Unlike Progressivism, Jefferson
did not believe that natural rights were contingent upon discrete his-
torical periods, or changing human mores.153  For him, “Nothing then
is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man.”154
John Adams likewise made clear that the principles of the Ameri-
can Revolution “are the principles of Aristotle and Plato, of Livy and
Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington, and Locke; the principles of nature
and eternal reason; the principles on which the whole government
over us now stands.”155  Adams and Jefferson even agreed on the pri-
150. Id.
151. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in 16 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 117, 118–19 (Library ed. 1904) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON].
152. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 93 (New ed. 1853).
153. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in
16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 151, at 42, 45–48.
154. Id. at 48.
155. John Adams, Novanglus: Addressed to the Inhabitants on the Colony of Massa-
chusetts Bay, No. I, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 26–27 (George W.
Carey ed., 2000); see also THE FOUNDERS ON RELIGION 132 (James H. Hutson ed.,
2005) (“To him who believes in the Existence and Attributes physical and moral of a
God, there can be no obscurity or perplexity in defining the Law of Nature to be his
wise benign and all powerful Will, discovered by Reason.  A Man who disbelieves the
Being of a God, will have no perplexity or obscurity in defining Morality or the Law
of Nature, natural Law, natural Right or any such Things to be mere Maxims of Con-
venience, to be Swifts pair of Breeches to be put on upon occasion for Decency or
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mary philosophic authorities for natural law and natural right princi-
ples, with both men referencing Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, and
Sidney.156
In his discussion of constitutional powers in Federalist Number 43,
James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, made reference to the
Declaration’s invocation of natural law: “[T]o the transcendent law of
nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happi-
ness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim,
and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed.”157
Alexander Hamilton was equally clear about his dedication to natu-
ral law principles in his debate with the Tory sympathizer, Samuel
Seabury: “[N]atural liberty is a gift of the beneficent Creator . . . .
Civil liberty is only natural liberty, modified and secured by the sanc-
tions of civil society.”158  Like Jefferson, Madison, and Adams, Hamil-
ton emphasized the central place natural rights must enjoy in a just
regime of liberty:
The principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoy-
ment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the im-
mutable laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in peace
without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by
the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows,
that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and
regulate these absolute rights of individuals.159
Finally, Hamilton made it clear that natural rights require positive
laws in order to “be preserved,” but that such rights pre-exist any such
positive laws: “The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged
for among old parchments or musty records.  They are written, as with
a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the Hand of the
Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal
power.”160
Although Adams and Hamilton—as federalists—were keen politi-
cal opponents of Jefferson and Madison—who helped create the op-
position democratic-republican party—they were all united in their
dedications to an understanding of man, positive law, and government
that was grounded in natural rights.  In Jefferson’s words, “All Ameri-
Conveniency and to be put off at pleasure for either.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams (Mar. 19, 1794)).
156. Adams adds Plato and Harrington to the list. John Adams, Novanglus, supra
note 155, at 26–27.
157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
158. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN TWELVE VOLUMES 53, 87 (Henry Cabot
Lodge ed., Fed. ed. 1904).
159. Id. at 63–64 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 120 (1765)).
160. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
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can Whigs thought alike on these subjects.”  It is this common under-
standing that came under attack with the advent of Progressivism.
A. The Progressive Critique and the Demise of Natural Rights
Progressive-era thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century
mounted a powerful and direct critique of the Founders’ natural rights
understanding of the first principles of government.  Noted scholars
and politicians came to embrace Progressivist theory and its concomi-
tant rejection of the Founders’ natural rights philosophy.161  As Pro-
fessor Thomas G. West observes, “The Progressives repeatedly
repudiated natural rights and natural-law as unjust, ignoble, and
untrue.”162
Writing in 1903, the influential professor Charles Edward Merriam,
who was an advisor to several U.S. Presidents, observed with approval
that the Founders’ understanding of natural rights was in a state of
severe decline: “The present tendency . . . in American political theory
is to disregard the once dominant ideas of natural rights and the social
contract . . . rights are considered to have their source not in nature,
but in law.”163  Merriam contended that this decline had reached the
state of terminal illness, stating that the “natural law and natural
rights” of the Founders had been discarded by intellectuals “with
practical unanimity.”164  Noted scholar John Dewey debunked the
natural rights thinking of the Founding generation as follows: “Natu-
ral rights and natural liberties exist only in the kingdom of mythologi-
cal social zoo¨logy.”165  The first president of the American Political
Science Association, Frank Johnson Goodnow, also contended that
the Founders’ understanding was an outdated relic because it pre-
dated “the theory of evolutionary development.”166 As these com-
ments indicate, Progressivist scholars believed that the Founders’
understanding of natural rights had been superseded by more ad-
vanced theories of social organization, theories grounded in positivism
and evolution.167  This Progressivist scholarship and politics eventually
made its way into the jurisprudence of Supreme Court justices.
161. See, e.g., AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 143; CHALLENGES TO THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING: SLAVERY, HISTORICISM, AND PROGRESSIVISM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY, supra note 143.
162. Thomas G. West, The Universal Principles of the American Founding, in THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING: ITS INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FRAMEWORK 53, 64 (Daniel
N. Robinson & Richard N. Williams eds., 2012).
163. C. EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 311
(1903).
164. Id. at 308–09.
165. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM & SOCIAL ACTION 17 (Capricorn Books 1963)
(1935).
166. Frank J. Goodnow, The American Conception of Liberty, in AMERICAN PRO-
GRESSIVISM, supra note 143, at 62.
167. For a more complete account of the thought of leading Progressivists, from
scholars to politicians, see generally AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 143.
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B. Progressivism and the High Court
Supreme Court Justices write legal opinions, not philosophical
tracts or treatises.  With this said, there is little doubt that one finds in
these opinions a consistent theoretical orientation.  Indeed, a common
observation, not to mention frequent complaint, is that the conserva-
tive and liberal members of the Court split their votes in a relatively
consistent and predictable fashion, particularly when it comes to
moral and social issues.  As will be discussed, many of the founda-
tional presuppositions underlying the opinions of the liberal members
of the Court—and Justices Stevens and Kennedy, in particular—can
be traced to Progressivist theory.  And while the conservative mem-
bers of the Court have not embraced Progressivist theory to the de-
gree that the liberal members have, the conservatives have generally
rejected the natural rights understanding of the Founders as well, only
to replace it with a different form of history-based jurisprudence.168
As we have seen in the quotes from the prominent Progressivist think-
ers, discussed above, a rejection of natural rights was a cornerstone of
Progressivist thought.
A useful place to begin consideration of the Supreme Court’s aban-
donment of the philosophy of the Founders is to compare the diver-
gent understandings of the common law of Alexander Hamilton and
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, respectively.  Alexander Hamilton, of
course, was not only one of the preeminent Founders but an accom-
plished lawyer as well.  He located “the great body of the common
law” in “[n]atural law and natural reason applied to the purposes of
society.”169  Justice Holmes, on the other hand, ridiculed this close as-
sociation between natural law and the common law: “The common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified; although
some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me to have for-
gotten the fact.”170  In fact, Holmes’s contempt for the idea of natural
law could be quite explicit: “The jurists who believe in natural law
seem to me to be in that naı¨ve state of mind that accepts what has
been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something
168. In fact, this Author knows of no Supreme Court Justice in the last one hundred
years or more who has spoken approvingly of a natural rights jurisprudence, with the
possible exception of Justice Clarence Thomas. But even Justice Thomas is reticent to
invoke natural rights in his opinions. See Broyles, Doubting Thomas, supra note 8, at
344.
169. Alexander Hamilton, Speech in the Case of Harry Croswell, in 8 THE WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN TWELVE VOLUMES, supra note 158, at 387, 421.
170. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), super-
seded by statute, Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
576, 86 Stat. 1251, 1265 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 903 (2006)), as
recognized in Dir. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459
U.S. 297 (1983).
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that must be accepted by all men everywhere.”171  In private corre-
spondence, Holmes was even more forceful: “All my life I have
sneered at the natural rights of man . . . .”172  By associating the com-
mon law with the voice of the political sovereign, as opposed to natu-
ral rights, Justice Holmes made clear that positive law—or more
generally, positivism—is the only real basis for law.  Like ghosts,
“brooding omnipresence[s]” are no longer believed in.173
In 1939, Justice Owen Roberts noted that those jurists who Justice
Holmes considered to possess “that naı¨ve state of mind” which they
shared with the Founders had disappeared from the Court, at least to
any meaningful extent:
At one time it was thought that [the Privileges and Immunities
Clause] recognized a group of rights which, according to the juris-
prudence of the day, were classed as “natural rights”; and that the
purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the United
States by guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition of
this group of rights by every other State.174
It is worth noting that Justice Roberts associated natural rights with
“the jurisprudence of the day,” thereby signaling the extent to which
the Founders’ understanding had at one time been adopted by the
judicial branch.
While this Article is primarily concerned with the theoretical under-
pinnings of Justices Stevens’s and Kennedy’s due process jurispru-
dence, several other examples of prominent Justices rejecting natural
rights help demonstrate the High Court’s overall abandonment of the
Founders’ understanding.  Indeed, Justice Holmes was influential to
these later Justices who came to adopt his argument.  Justice William
O. Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in the famous modern
substantive due process case, Griswold v. Connecticut,175 embraced
Justice Holmes’s disparagement of natural law:
We agree, of course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics.”  Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause is
not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.  In determin-
ing what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we
have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.176
171. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918).
172. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 21 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
173. See generally LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 130–47.
174. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (emphasis added).
175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
176. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (quoting Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)).
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Justice Hugo Black was even more straight-forward:
[T]he “natural law” formula which the Court uses to reach its con-
clusion in this case should be abandoned as an incongruous excres-
cence on our Constitution.  I believe that formula to be itself a
violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at
the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in
fields where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legisla-
tive power.177
In turning to Justices Stevens and Kennedy, I have found no express
criticism of natural rights by the former.  Justice Kennedy, however,
has been more forthcoming.  In writing the opinion in a case involving
the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Kennedy suggested that neither the
Constitution itself, nor the Founders’ understanding of the Constitu-
tion, is connected with natural law:
Despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, the fact that a right is
not defeasible by statute means only that it is protected by the Con-
stitution, not that it derives from natural law . . . .  By the same
token, the contours of sovereign immunity are determined by the
Founders’ understanding, not by the principles or limitations de-
rived from natural law.178
Not only did Justice Kennedy find natural law principles irrelevant
to constitutional analysis, he also found the dissent’s attempt to associ-
ate his reasoning with such principles to be in the nature of a smear
campaign: “In an apparent attempt to disparage a conclusion with
which it disagrees, the dissent attributes our reasoning to natural
law.”179  Justice Kennedy, then, is consistent with modern-day jurists
who overwhelmingly reject natural rights.  As Bradley Watson ob-
serves, “The modern era justices . . . deny in principle the existence of
natural standards, or the authority of the Constitution as it was writ-
ten.  The earlier justices look back; the modern justices look
forward.”180
But Progressivist theory, and the justices who came to embrace it,
not only rejected what it considered the time-bound understanding of
natural law and natural rights of the founding generation, it replaced
that understanding with what was considered a new insight into the
historically contingent nature of things: an insight that “couple[d] this
perspective of historical contingency with a deep faith in historical
progress.”181  Bradley Watson argues that Justices Louis Brandeis and
Benjamin Cardozo join Justice Holmes as the “three jurists [who] en-
177. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled
in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
178. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 734 (1999).
179. Id. at 758.
180. LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 115.
181. AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 143, at 3.
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capsulate the essence of Progressivism as legal theory in the most
comprehensive and telling manner.”182
Whereas Thomas Jefferson had famously declared in the Declara-
tion of Independence that certain truths are “self-evident,” Justice
Holmes denied the existence of any such truths.183  Rather than rely-
ing on self-evident truths or propositions, Justice Holmes contended
that judges largely decide matters based on the opinions of the day,
although those opinions and the resultant decisions change with the
times.184  Judges make decisions:
Because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a
class, or because of some opinion as to policy . . . .  Such matters
really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for determi-
nations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can
do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given
time and place . . . .  [O]ur law is open to reconsideration upon a
slight change in the habit of the public mind.  No concrete proposi-
tion is self-evident . . . .185
Historically contingent preferences, not legal principles, are the ulti-
mate drivers of legal decisions.  History, for Progressives, has replaced
a reliance on natural law principles and the self-evident truths states-
men and jurists can glean therefrom.
Turning then to Justices Stevens and Kennedy: What, if anything, do
we discern in their opinions that leads to the conclusion that Progres-
sivism’s tenets play a decisive role in their respective jurisprudences,
and, in particular, in their understandings of substantive due process?
As an initial observation, we have seen that Justice Kennedy agrees
with a critical tenet of Progressivism: a rejection of natural rights.  Jus-
tice Stevens, on the other hand, is largely silent on the subject.
Neither Justice, of course, believes natural law or natural rights are in
any way relevant to the understanding of “liberty” set forth in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Both Justices, moreover, share a
faith in history as an evolutionary vehicle for the continued progress
and improvement of the human condition—at least in terms of indi-
vidual, personal rights—in America.
We have seen in the arguments concerning constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests advanced by both Justices Stevens and Ken-
nedy, an identification of certain basic propositions.  Despite the fact
that they employ different constitutional tests, both Justices share a
definition of liberty that identifies the following essential propositions:
(1) the Founders did not attempt to define what “liberty” means in the
Constitution, but rather left it to future generations to supply its es-
sential terms; (2) societal mores are evolving as society matures, re-
182. LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 111.
183. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
184. Id. at 460.
185. Id. at 466.
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placing outdated misconceptions186 with more advanced insights into
the meaning of liberty; (3) that evolutionary process has recognized
that liberty encompasses a notion of autonomous individuality that
takes the form of self-definition; and (4) the Supreme Court is
uniquely equipped to recognize the new liberty interests and provide
them constitutional protection.
The first three of these criteria reflect the basic tenets of Progressiv-
ism.  Progressivism rejects any attempt to return to the Founders’
understanding of natural rights, as do Stevens and Kennedy.  Progres-
sivism sees history through the lens of evolutionary development to-
ward more advanced notions of moral consciousness, as do Stevens
and Kennedy.  Progressivism derides any natural law limits on moral
decision-making, thereby opening the door for essentially subjective
concepts of liberty such as those advanced by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy.  In these critical respects, Justices Stevens and Kennedy are
the intellectual heirs of Progressivism.
When laws are passed that significantly infringe upon constitution-
ally protected liberty interests, as defined by the Stevens-Kennedy cri-
teria, the Court can choose to apply either one of two tests.  One, the
Court can describe the purpose and effect of those laws to be unexam-
ined prejudices of the past—animus—that seek to, and in fact do, sig-
nificantly burden the liberty interest in question.  If found to meet the
named criteria, the law will be struck down as failing rational basis
review.  This may be the preferred route if the Court, for some rea-
son,187 is not inclined to declare the liberty interest to be fundamental
in nature.  If the Court is willing to describe the liberty interest as
fundamental in nature, the Justices can easily strike the law down by
finding that it fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.  While the two tests pro-
vide the Court with greater flexibility in protecting those liberties it
finds worthy of protection, there is no real conceptual difference be-
tween the liberties protected under either test.  The result is that the
need for analyzing whether a right is fundamental or not is dimin-
ished, and this may serve to undermine our understanding of what are
our nation’s deepest principles; in particular, what is our understand-
ing of liberty.
VI. CONCLUSION
In writing the plurality opinion in McDonald, Justice Alito em-
ployed the familiar history and tradition test set forth in Washington v.
Glucksberg to find the right to bear arms sufficiently fundamental that
186. Including, and perhaps in particular, those time-bound conceptions of human
nature that the Founders understood in connection with natural law and natural
rights.
187. Indeed, Justice Kennedy may well have been reticent to declare same-sex sex a
fundamental right in Lawrence given the controversy this would have aroused. The
continuing controversy over Roe v. Wade is surely not lost on the Court.
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it was secure against state infringement.  As noted, in his concurrence
in McDonald—a concurrence directed at rebutting Justice Stevens’s
theory of substantive due process—Justice Scalia repeated the same
“history and tradition” test.  This is the test the conservative members
of the Court consider appropriate when analyzing substantive due
process issues.
The liberal members of the Court reject what they consider to be
the time-bound jurisprudence of the conservatives.  Following Justices
Stevens and Kennedy, they contend for a theory of liberty interests
that deserve protection under the Constitution by virtue of their ex-
pansive, dynamic qualities: qualities that embrace self-definition and a
future-oriented, evolving moral consciousness.
Despite their differences, in the final analysis both the conservative
and liberal members of the Court share a common theoretical founda-
tion upon which their respective jurisprudences are built: that of his-
tory.  Janus-like, they differ only in the direction they face when
evaluating the teachings of history.  The liberal members look to the
future while the conservative members look to the past.
For the present, the understanding of constitutionally protected
“liberty” that prevails in the High Court has been defined and delim-
ited by Justices Stevens and Kennedy.  Moreover, the conservative
members of the Court lack a convincing counter-argument.  But while
both the conservative and liberal wings of the Court claim to be keep-
ing faith with the Founders, neither embraces the trans-historical un-
derstanding upon which the Founders established their constitutional
first principles.  Moreover, and unlike the Founders, both can be chal-
lenged on the basis that each lacks a discriminating principle: for his-
tory alone, whether directed toward the future or the past, lacks such
a principle.  In attempting to steer their jurisprudential ships upon the
seas of future litigation, both sides may be said to lack a star to steer
by.  Furthermore, no reconciliation is possible, and the Court will con-
tinue to remain divided as issues concerning fundamental rights come
before it.
